Daniel Convissor's Website

City Limits

University of Chicago Press, 1981

Part 1: An Alternative Theory of Urban Politics

CH 1: City Limits and the Study of Urban Politics

• business/financial elite making decisions
• pluralism in which everyone participating
• elite keeping things off agenda

p7 party v. reform politics often thought of in class terms, but it's not

p16 three policy categories

• developmental: enhance productivity
• redistributive: "those which have an adverse economic impact... are identified as ~" [Come on, that's not what it means]
• allocational: neutral

CH 2: The Interests of the Limited City

p21 [Homeowner tax deduction of mortgage, do apt bldg owners get it too???]

p22 economic interests. having exports is critical to draw in $. need good infrastructure

• land use: regulation thereof is most powerful thing cities do. highly localized decisions and land is needed to perform economic activities
• labor: supply of amenities to middle class neighborhoods & don't provide welfare, all to attract those who will be most productive in the labor market.
• capital: taxation, environmental regulation, land give aways

p31 cities can't provide services to low income residents since it will erode fiscal competitiveness of the municipality due to high taxes. [Poor people laying in the streets and/or robbing people is not too good for the quality of life for the middle class workers. Perhaps he could have looked at the effect of redistributional policies on the crime rate.]

p33 municipalities can't deliver efficient services. these inefficiencies will be borne by the residents till the cost of inefficiency exceed the cost of moving

p34 average taxpayer (the median ratio of benefit/tax) getting less benefits for each tax dollar. Ratio is from 0>1, with 1 being an unobtainable maximum because government isn't efficient. [Isn't it actually able to go over 1 since some people get significant benefits while paying little in taxes???] No one gets all the services wanted, so the ratio of benefit/tax has to be less than 1. Supply of public services is always wanted to be more than is provided, so supply/demand ratio is <0. Municipalities try to provide expenditures at the level where these two factors intercept.

p36 average taxpayer is at the mean in the tax/benefit ratio, where half the payers get more in services and half the payers get less in services than that average taxpayer. This is weighted in proportion to the amount paid. "if his benefit/tax ratio is less than that of the other taxpayers, then he is the average taxpayer." [The way he words it is that the average taxpayer gets less in services than everyone else.]

[Talking about average taxpayer is supposed to pull on heart strings. He talks a lot of tax/benefit not much on supply/demand.]

Low cost governments are at a competitive advantage in market for people, redistributive efforts hinder that.

Part 2: City Limits and Public Policy

CH 3: The Three Policy Arenas

CH 4: Toward a New Theory of Federalism

• income inelastic: changes with inflation/economic growth. [Doesn't change with income of individuals living there. Inflation adjusted incomes going down.]
• surcharge on one good: capital tax and borne by owner not consumer
• disproportionate on low income: "not an excise tax on the consumer" so "safer to assert that the property tax is levied roughly in proportion to income" [This is a complete blowoff. Is he trying to say that people with more income live in higher valued homes or can afford to move to high tax areas so they de facto pay more in property taxes? What about families living in Jersey City their entire lives now being gouged due to abatements on big developments? What about when property values or taxes go up but income doesn't go up as much, remains constant or declines???]

p78 
Table 4.3
Governmental Expenditures from Own Fiscal Resources
(percentage distribution among functions)

               local  state federal

Redistribution:  14%    35%     55%
Allocation:      29%     8%      4%
Development:     18%    14%     17%
Education:       34%    38%      8%
Interest:         6%     3%     10%
                ----   ----    ----
                100%   100%    100%


Table 4.4
Governmental Expenditures from Own Fiscal Resources
(percentage distribution among governments)

               local  state federal   total

Redistribution:   7%    22%     71%    100%
Allocation:      60%    20%     19%    100%
Development:     24%    21%     55%    100%
Education:       35%    45%     20%    100%
Interest:        17%    10%     73%    100%

Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title I (1965). learning deficient children from low income families. doesn't help wealthier taxpayers children, encourages poor families to come to district. no matching funds. major oversight. [Doesn't see educating poor to get them out of poverty to be developmental.]

CH 5: Cities, Suburbs and Their Schools

Part 3: City Limits and Urban Politics

CH 6: Parties and Groups in Local Politics

p122 congress is more open than local politics. [But there's so much going on it's impossible to pay attention to it all.] Media coverage of congress is better due to competition of media to get the big scoop. There's generally little local competition in media, just one paper. Congress is open to public.

National policies are critical to local well being: economy, war/peace, monetary policy

p126 local politicians are less ambitions and make less of a job out of it so care less. National figures get well endowed and want to keep their jobs.

p127 not much polling done at local level

p129 most effective local advocacy focuses on economic improvement arguments

CH 7: The Politics of Development

p135 enviro/community groups winning over highways, due to waning power of highway development.

p140-142 the "power elite" is not a valid theory because they are not a unified force. [They don't have to be. Often their favors are granted on an individual basis. The theory, as the author points out, is not needed on broader issues.]

p143 sets up a theory and then shoots it to pieces.

p144 urban renewal of New Haven was successful [???]

New Haven: sharp mayor gets major $ and has major success. Congeals public opinion and support.

Oakland: slow moving mayor, business leaders push a plan, resulted in ineffective project and got little money

Development happens because it has to keep city going.

CH 8: The Politics of Allocation

Politicians can more easily utilize ethnicity than class. Class means redistribution. Ethnic recognition is giving jobs and showing up at events allowing parades etc

p160 Black struggle paid off at national level where redistribution is possible. Civil Rights Act of 64-5. Food Stamps Welfare Great Society [These are things that help all poor, not just blacks. Most recipients are white.]

p161 Blacks are "overrepresented" in managerial/administrative/technical positions in public sector COMPARED to the PRIVATE sector. Caused by political desires/attempts to assuage black voters, and hiring is something local politicians can control. [The private sector has representation below population and unemployment in black community is far higher than whites.]

Municipal employees are a voting block.

CH 9: The Politics of Redistribution

air pollution is similar. overregulation hampers your competitive edge. [Polluted cities with lots of sick people is not good for competition either.]

p175 rent strikes in Harlem 1964 to bring buildings up to code, organized by Jesse Grey. Resulted in:

• federal heating program to take care of unheated buildings
• federal housing development
• federal rat extermination
• city commission taking a look at restructuring housing operations

Managing Conflict

1. Delay:
   • Ignore: hope they go away
   • Meet: with hope they'll be placated
   • Form Commission: stall for months/years, shows something being done, hope things dissipate in mean time.
2. Turn Redistributive Issues into Allocational Issues:
   • Meet specific grievances but not broader causes
   • Experimental Projects: don't have to continue or do city wide
   • Cooptation: get leaders involved in policy process via meetings, jobs, conferences so they can see how hard public policy is, and or distract them, and have them come up with more realistic goals.
3. Convert Economically Redistributive Issues into Political Issues:
   • Modifying government operations, such as adding public participation or shuffling departments, can demonstrate that the government is interested in change, though this really doesn't do much.

Part 4: Changing the Limits on Urban Policy

CH 10: Is New York a Deviant Case?

p189 Crime/unsanitary conditions that accompany low income groups. [If they were employed, perhaps they wouldn't have to resort to crime? Author sounds racist.]

people/jobs leaving due to other policies resulted in little economic base to support services for remaining individuals.

Lindsay ambitions pushed toward short term gains at expense of long term stability fed state matching requirements burdened city

p190-191 PAST BUDGETARY ANALYSIS

1963-1974 rapid expansion of budget and employees. major employment increase in 1960's and doubled the rate when Lindsay was in office.

NYC used to be all powerful and could afford redistributive services such as CUNY. National/global scene has changed dramatically with suburbs and other cities rising in importance/population/jobs. City still continued dramatic policies and modestly increased its self funded costs each year. The city's means kept shrinking while the expenditures modestly expanded.

Group pressure/lobbying is strong in NYC too. Groups thrive

CH 11: Redistribution in the Federal System

1. full faith and credit of us gvt behind local debt
2. revenue sharing plans
3. minimum standards instead of grants