What about ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, as applied to human character and behaviour? Are these judgments, too, ‘logically vulnerable to facts’? Or could any use of these words—so long as it’s consistent—make sense? Consider, [Philippa Foot] asks: could we understand someone who says that someone is a good man ‘because he clasped and unclasped his hands’ or refuses to ‘run round trees left-handed, or look at hedgehogs in the light of the moon’? … Just try to talk about ethics while leaving behind considerations of what makes human lives go well or badly—the foundations on which Aristotle and Aquinas built their whole theories. It can’t be done.

Benjamin J. B. Lipscomb, The Women Are Up to Something: How Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley and Iris Murdoch Revolutionised Ethics, in Thomas Nagel, “What Is Rude?”