David Axe notes a potential problem with the NLOS-C (Non Line of Sight-Cannon), the Howitzer variant of the the Future Combat System Manned Ground Vehicles (FCS-MGV) which the Army intends to have replace nearly all existing US armored vehicles.

Specifically, by virtue of the high level of sophistication and automation, the NLOS-C has a crew of only two, as compared to 4 for the current howitzer, the Paladin.

If the future NLOS-C units reduce their manning requirements to fill the minimum number of people needed to operate the systems without considering the need to maintain continuous operations and endure battle losses, the expensive high-speed cannon might be silent when needed because an adequate number of Soldiers are not available to operate it.

A commenter on his blog notes that for for a 6 tube battery, you have 42 men, 4 per paladin, and 3 on each of the 6 ammunition carriers, for a total of 42 men.

For NLOS-C, with automated firing and loading, this is likely down to 24 men, possibly fewer depending on how the army allocates loading vehicles, and the loss of one man on any of these vehicles will likely take that out of action.

With the current setup, the Paladin and its loading vehicles can operate at reduced capacity with short crews. The same is not realistic with a lone crewman operating a vehicle.

Additionally, in a situation like Iraq and Afghanistan, which is still the most likely conflict scenario, it is likely that these troops would not just be assigned to artillery duty, but also to, “non-standard missions, which require the Soldiers to anything from patrols to base security”, which, “demand at least the current number of Soldiers, if not more, to complete such missions.”

It appears that one of the institutional myths present in Pentagon doctrine is that the individual soldier is ruinously expensive, and replacing him/her with technology or private contractors will create a more effective, and more cost effective war fighting force.

The performance of systems and reduced crews, in addition to the performance of mercenaries private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proven this assumption to be disastrously wrong.