Month: March 2009

Thick flying wing for UAVs faces windtunnel tests

Interesting new aerodynamic concept here, a very thick wing with slots in it to improve lift to drag ratio.

I have no clue if it will work, though there is rather a lot of analysis that indicates that it might, but given the non-aerodynamic advantages of a thicker wing in terms of structure and volume, it is an intriguing concept.

It appears that this could be tied with some sort of bleed air technologies to work as control systems too.

US Air Force Sacrificing ECM Capabilities to Push F-22 & F-35

The Air Force has yet canceled the stand-off jammer EB-52.

If you look at electronic warfare assets for the USAF, they have been starved for some time, and the USAF’s argument is that AESA radars can fill the gap on their stealth platforms.

To my mind, what is going on here is that the Air Force is systematically defunding projects that might constitute a threat to the F-22, F-35, B-2, and NGB.

If you possess sufficient EW capabilities to negate the newer integrated air defense systems, then you don’t need stealth, so those EW capabilities have to be killed, even if they, as in the case of the EB-52, make stealth more effective and more survivable.

GAO Report Savages Future Combat System

Seriously, the report is brutal:

Advocates of restructuring or cutting back on FCS will find ammunition in the draft report. In it, GAO asserts that FCS is “unlikely to be executed” for the $159 billion the Army says it will cost, a source said, citing the draft.

Moreover, and perhaps more relevant to the current decision-making within the Pentagon, GAO states that the Army has already spent 60 percent of its FCS development funds even though “the most expensive activities remain to be done before the production decision” in 2013.

GAO contends that the funding situation will deteriorate for FCS as the program’s costs will likely grow at the same time as competition for federal funds tightens, a source said.

The report also cites what it calls “actual immaturity” in the program, according to sources. Calling the network performance “largely unproven,” GAO says the Army has failed to convincingly demonstrate that FCS designs will meet their requirements, a source told ITA.

I am completely not shocked at this. I worked on the program, and it was over ambitious, and managed under the now discredited Lead System Integrator (LSI) concept, which been universally unsuccessful.

It’s no surprise that this whole program has turned into a clusterf^%$.

The Case for the Abolition of the US Air Force

Robert Dilger and Pierre Sprey, the latter being largely responsible for the A-10 and F-16, are arguing that the current procurement strategy of the US Air Force does not serve the military needs of the rest of the military.

The thing is that they provide a historical perspective or an organization that has always continued to follow the failed philosophy of Giulio Douhet, and it’s clear that the Air Force is not, and has never been, capable of providing for the needs of the warfighters, because they continue to pursue the elusive goal of total victory from an air campaign alone.

This goal has never worked except in a nuclear scenario, and their observation is spot on:

In summary, over the last 60 years of combat, our Air Force has, at higher and higher cost, demonstrated less and less effect on the outcome of each succeeding war. The root causes are equally clear: first, the blind insistence on procuring and planning for little besides the failed strategic bombardment mission; and second, the ingrained development incentives that reward increasing unit cost and complexity without regard to the effect on actual combat effectiveness and force size. If the new Administration follows the “business as usual” pattern, the sequence of events and outcomes is easy to project.

While these problems have existed since the creation of an air force, even in the USAAC days, it has become progressively worse as the Air Force has continued as an independent branch.

As to their specific recommendations:

  1. A new close support aircraft smaller, more survivable, and more lethal than the A-10, one that is affordable in vastly larger numbers. (The Air Force plans to use small numbers of the unmaneuverable, highly vulnerable and ineffective F-35, at $150 million each, for this mission.)
  2. A forward controller spotter plane dramatically more survivable, longer-loitering and far lower cost in than a helicopter, able to land next to the tents of the supported troops. (The Air Force suffers from the delusion that close support can be called in using drones, satellites, and other “high tech” sensors, contrary to the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.)
  3. A small, affordable dirt strip airlifter to meet the real emergency needs of beleaguered battalions in the boonies. (The Air Force always short-changes this in-the-mud prop mission in favor of large jet transports.)
  4. A super-maneuverable new air-to-air dogfighter with all–passive electronics, far smaller with far higher maneuvering performance than the best of the F-16s and thus able to outfight the F-22 or any other advanced fighter in the world. (Emitting no radio/radar signals whatsoever, this new fighter will obsolete the F-22’s electronics, defeat any enemy fighter’s passive warning/identification-friend-or-foe system, and render useless the enemy’s radar-homing missiles which rely on seeking our fighter radars.)

I agree with items 1-3, but I am dubious of 4, where I do think that the provision of a radar, both for BVR air to air and poor weather strike missions would be desirable, though I think that advances in electronics could vastly reduce the weight of such a system.

I would also add another procedural change, and remove procurement authority from the service, and place it in the hands of the US Army, who, after all, is the consumer of the services that the USAF offers.

Is the US Navy Falling to Pieces?

Because the service has just classified ship inspection reports, and the only reason that I can think of their doing so is to cover up either bad reports on newly constructed ships, or of maintenance shortcomings for the existing fleet:

InSurvs are circulated widely among commanders and technical authorities within the Navy, but seldom seen by civilians unless they’ve been specifically requested under freedom of information laws. Even then, Navy officials can redact the names of people; information about classified equipment; or trade secrets of shipbuilders or other venders.

Over the past year, InSurvs obtained by Navy Times have revealed severe problems aboard the cruiser Chosin, the destroyer Stout and the amphibious transport dock New Orleans.

(emphasis mine)

Maybe I’m just paranoid, but I think that there are a lot more “severe problems” out there.

Stating the Blatantly Obvious: Defense Procurement Edition

Finally, we are now seeing procurement experts suggesting that cost be made a formal requirement on major procurement programs, the technical term is Key Performance Parameter (KPP), to which I would add schedule.

Among other things, this would mean that going over budget at all would be grounds for termination for cause (no money) as opposed to a termination for convenience (cost plus).

I would in fact suggest that cost and schedule be made “super-requirements,” and that other requirements would be subordinate to them.

What this would mean is that we would not procure immature technologies, and that the costs would be known at the start of a program, which would prevent the 20+ year F-22/JSF type hideously expensive procurement debacles.

The Tanker Competion is Back

Yes, the 767-A330 competion rebid advanced, as the Joint Requirement Oversight Council is reviewing the new requirements for the recompete.

This is going to be a long and expensive process, and the A330 is superior (more flexible, longer range, carries more fuel, and the tanker is flying now), and Murtha’s suggestion for a dual buy to forestall another challenge is ruinously expensive over the life of the program.

Won’t be pretty.

Yeah, Like This is Going to Work

It appears that India’s response to its troubled contract to buy the refurbished Admiral Gorshkov has led them to start construction of their own carrier in their own shipyards.

Considering India’s history in weapons development, Arjun Tank, Tejas light fighter, Kaveri engine, the Nag anti-tank missile(!), each more than 20 years in development without operational deployment, this is not a course of action that I would take.

This has fiasco written all over it.

What the Smart Economists Say

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker is saying that we need to go back to separate investment and commercial banks, a return to something very much like Glass-Steagall, which Phil Gramm and His Evil Minions got repealed at the turn of the century.

In the not-fed-chair-but-a-Nobel division, we have Myron Scholes saying that “blow up or burn” over-the-counter derivative trading markets if we are serious about fixing the financial crisis:

The markets have stopped functioning and are failing to provide pricing signals, Scholes, 67, said today at a panel discussion at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Participants need a way to exit transactions and get a “fresh start,” he said.

The “solution is really to blow up or burn the OTC market, the CDSs and swaps and structured products, and let us start over,” he said, referring to credit-default swaps and other complex securities that are traded off exchanges. “One way to do that, through the auspices of regulators or the banking commissioners, is to try to close all contracts at mid-market prices.”

Alan “Bubbles” Greenspan must be turning over in his grave, or maybe he’s turning over in Ayn Rand’s grave, where he resides until the sun sets.

Paul Krugman Is Freaking Out

Specifically, he is freaking out over the “let them eat cake” policies of Mssrs. Geithner and Summers with regard to the insolvent banking giants:

….Policy is stuck in a holding pattern.

Here’s how the pattern works: first, administration officials, usually speaking off the record, float a plan for rescuing the banks in the press. This trial balloon is quickly shot down by informed commentators.

Then, a few weeks later, the administration floats a new plan. This plan is, however, just a thinly disguised version of the previous plan, a fact quickly realized by all concerned. And the cycle starts again.

He is referring, of course to Geithner’s insistence that the big sh%$pile has an “artificially depressed value”, and Ben Bernanke’s denial of zombie financial institutions, including AIG (!).

These, quite honestly delusional preconceptions have a very real cost, as the Nobel prize winning economist notes:

But this refusal to face the facts means, in practice, an absence of action. And I share the president’s fears: inaction could result in an economy that sputters along, not for months or years, but for a decade or more.

(emphasis mine)

Personally, I lay even more of this at the feet of Lawrence Summers than I do either Geithner or Bernanke: He was one of the most vociferous free-market mousketeers, and his professional life has been marked by failure and misery left in his wake.

Of course, Summers will come out of this clean, as he has mastered the art of failing up even more than Dick Cheney.

Because Timothy Geithner is a Loser

So, Annette Nazareth and Caroline Atkinson, have withdrawn their names from consideration for positions working in the department of the Treasury, and we have blame placed on Senate delays, and the Obama Administration’s thoroughly anal retentive vetting process.

I have no doubt that both of these issues figure prominently in some of the difficulties in staffing, though Obama is actually well ahead of the pace of recent transitions, but I think that there is another factor.

I think that a number of people out there believe that Timothy Geithner, and be extension, Lawrence Summers, simply don’t get it with the banking crisis, and that they are wrong, and that they will continue to refuse to recognize the reality that a number of the gargantuan banks in the US are simply insolvent, and so they are refusing to do the sane thing, and put them in receivership. (or pre-privatization, nationalization, or whatever the frack you want to call it)

Simply put, they recognize that in the next 6-18 months, there is a real possibility that working with Timothy Geithner on their resume will look like working with Hank Paulson, and in any case, they want no part of a policy that they see as an train wreck.