So, the House-Senate Conference Committee agreed to fund the F136 alternate engine for the JSF, despite a qualified veto threat from the White House.

By qualified, I mean that “sources in the WH” have said that they would “recommend a veto,” if the engine were funded, which is quite different from the flat out statement that Obama would veto anything with the F-22 white elephant Raptor.

While the weak veto threat is one of the reasons that supporters of the alternate engine have gained momentum, there is also the fact that Pratt & Whitney is doing back-flips on cost and schedule in order to try to kill the RR/GE F136 engine, which reinforces the idea that they see a real threat their profit model for the F135 engine.

Additionally, the idea that the program managers can squeeze P&W just as hard if there is no competitor out in the wings is plainly ludicrous, and the F100/F110 “engine war” of the 1980s clearly shows that.

The reason that the DoD is fighting the alternate engine at this point, is because they really want the JSF, and even a small amount of money, even if it pays ten fold dividends further out, may push the JSF further down the delay/cost escalation/procurement cuts cycle.

Ashton Carter^* pretty much says that flat out when he says that, “The crux of the analysis is that the additional upfront costs of a second engine are very clear and very real and the possible savings associated with a hypothesized competition in the future are much harder to estimate.”

That being said, the development of the F-136 is not going perfectly. The manufacturers just had to halt testing following the discovery of damage to the turbine, described as “nicks and dings”.