Robert Dilger and Pierre Sprey, the latter being largely responsible for the A-10 and F-16, are arguing that the current procurement strategy of the US Air Force does not serve the military needs of the rest of the military.

The thing is that they provide a historical perspective or an organization that has always continued to follow the failed philosophy of Giulio Douhet, and it’s clear that the Air Force is not, and has never been, capable of providing for the needs of the warfighters, because they continue to pursue the elusive goal of total victory from an air campaign alone.

This goal has never worked except in a nuclear scenario, and their observation is spot on:

In summary, over the last 60 years of combat, our Air Force has, at higher and higher cost, demonstrated less and less effect on the outcome of each succeeding war. The root causes are equally clear: first, the blind insistence on procuring and planning for little besides the failed strategic bombardment mission; and second, the ingrained development incentives that reward increasing unit cost and complexity without regard to the effect on actual combat effectiveness and force size. If the new Administration follows the “business as usual” pattern, the sequence of events and outcomes is easy to project.

While these problems have existed since the creation of an air force, even in the USAAC days, it has become progressively worse as the Air Force has continued as an independent branch.

As to their specific recommendations:

1. A new close support aircraft smaller, more survivable, and more lethal than the A-10, one that is affordable in vastly larger numbers. (The Air Force plans to use small numbers of the unmaneuverable, highly vulnerable and ineffective F-35, at $150 million each, for this mission.)
2. A forward controller spotter plane dramatically more survivable, longer-loitering and far lower cost in than a helicopter, able to land next to the tents of the supported troops. (The Air Force suffers from the delusion that close support can be called in using drones, satellites, and other “high tech” sensors, contrary to the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.)
3. A small, affordable dirt strip airlifter to meet the real emergency needs of beleaguered battalions in the boonies. (The Air Force always short-changes this in-the-mud prop mission in favor of large jet transports.)
4. A super-maneuverable new air-to-air dogfighter with all–passive electronics, far smaller with far higher maneuvering performance than the best of the F-16s and thus able to outfight the F-22 or any other advanced fighter in the world. (Emitting no radio/radar signals whatsoever, this new fighter will obsolete the F-22’s electronics, defeat any enemy fighter’s passive warning/identification-friend-or-foe system, and render useless the enemy’s radar-homing missiles which rely on seeking our fighter radars.)

I agree with items 1-3, but I am dubious of 4, where I do think that the provision of a radar, both for BVR air to air and poor weather strike missions would be desirable, though I think that advances in electronics could vastly reduce the weight of such a system.

I would also add another procedural change, and remove procurement authority from the service, and place it in the hands of the US Army, who, after all, is the consumer of the services that the USAF offers.