We’ve seen this with the Future Combat Systems, EFV (the landing craft former known as the AAAV), the Comanche helicopter, DDG-10000, and the slow motion implosion of the LCS and the JSF.

We see that the programs start with over-ambitious requirements, which lead to protracted development schedules, escalating costs.

This leads changes to the requirements, leading to further schedule and cost slippage, rinse, lather, repeat.

I’m generally not to concerned about this, I’m of the belief that superior training, tactics, and situational awareness will win the day. The success of the F4F Wildcat versus A6M Rei-sen (Zero) is an example of this.

Superior tactics and situational awareness are largely function of effective communication, so to my mind the cancelation of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a bigger deal than most of the higher profile cancellations:

…

What tied them down was their radios: a forest of plastic and metal cubes sprouting antennae of different lengths and sizes. They had short-range models for talking with the reconstruction team; longer-range versions for reaching headquarters 25 miles away; and a backup satellite radio in case the mountains blocked the transmission. An Air Force controller carried his own radio for talking to jet fighters overhead and a separate radio for downloading streaming video from the aircraft

…

Almost fifteen years ago, the Army launched an ambitious program, the Joint Tactical Radio System [3], aimed at developing several highly-compatible “universal” radios. Together, the JTRS radios would replace nearly all older radios in the American arsenal, greatly simplifying communications and freeing up combat units “to tap into the network on the move,” according to Paul Mehney, an Army spokesman.

But JTRS, pronounced “jitters,” failed to live up to its promise. Overly ambitious, poorly managed and saddled by incompatible goals, the program burned through $6 billion dollars while producing little working hardware. Delays forced the Army to spend $11 billion more on old-style radios to meet the urgent demands of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

The Army eventually reduced the planned purchase of JTRS radios and cut the types of radios in development. In October, it canceled the vehicle-mounted version of JTRS, the most important of the new radios, which by then had grown to the size of a dormitory-sized refrigerator. For all practical purposes, JTRS is dead — at least in its original guise.

…

JTRS’ history is one of grand but naive technological ambition colliding with the unbending laws of physics and the unforgiving exigencies of modern warfare. After years of work, the Army discovered for itself what experts had been warning all along: It’s impossible for a single radio design to handle all the military’s different communications tasks.

The more capabilities that the Army and prime contractor Boeing packed into JTRS, the bigger, more complex and more expensive it became — until it was too bulky and unreliable for combat. In its relentless drive for conceptual simplicity, the Army found itself mired in mechanical complexity.

The Army wasn’t alone in its doomed pursuit of a technological pipe dream. The past decade has by many accounts been an era of grand ambition, flawed management and wasted treasure for all the military branches. A lengthy Harvard Business School study for the Pentagon concluded in April that despite many attempts at reform, “major defense programs still require more than 15 years to deliver less capability than planned, often at two to three times the planned cost.”

Unlike most of the high tech systems, which have next to no relevance in our current conflicts, there are very real shortcomings in the complex and frequently non-interoperable hodgepodge of communications equipment used by our forces. (The article linked above refers to one such situation in Afghanistan)

If our defense procurement and R&D system takes 15 years to take a radio system from concept through cancellation, we are completely f%$#ed.

Our own corrupt military-industrial complex appears ready to implode under the weight of its own dysfunction.