First a disclaimer, this is not an essay on the rightness or the wrongness of the Gaza operation. It is an analysis of the tactics used with an eye toward tactical lessons learned from the Lebanon war, and toward lessons that should be learned by the US military.

Think of it as the War Nerd, without the good writing.

Aviation Week & Space Technology has an analysis of the combat in the Gaza Strip (paid subscription required), and it’s basic conclusion is rather unsurprising, though it’s rather controversial in some military circles, that air force operations must be completely subordinate to the ground forces authority.

Considering the debacle in Lebanon in 2006, where the Chief of Staff was the first, and likely the last, Air Force general, and worked on the USAF model, basically the assumption that precision guided munitions delivered from altitudes in excess of 8000 feet could win the war, this is not an unanticipated change in tactics.

One need only look at Afghanistan to see that the Taliban’s best recruiting tool is the USAF.

Some of the things that they did that worked on a tactical level:

• Using retired/reserve air force officers physically in the ground units as liaison officers.
• Each brigade had a specific helicopter squadron specifically assigned to them, and under their command.
• One pilot from the helicopter squadron was physically assigned to the brigade’s communication cell, and he conducted all communications with the helicopter squadron.
• A tightly integrated network to allow handoff from target identification to strike in less than 1 minute.
• The brigade teams had significant autonomy from the high command in Tel Aviv.
• Each brigade had its own dedicated artillery support.
• Extensive operations at night, to take advantage of the Israeli superiority in night vision systems.

This does not make Gaza operations a victory, but these are lessons that the US military, and particularly the bomb happy boys in blue in the USAF, desperately need to learn for Afghanistan.